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1. Many marine protected areas around the world are ‘paper parks. A key factor 
contributing to their ineffectiveness is non-compliance with the rules in place.   
2. This paper contributes to the existing academic discussion on paper parks by 
originally drawing on critical regulation scholarship to develop a theoretical framework 
to assess and address compliance gaps in MPAs.  
3. The theoretical insights are then explored using acase study of the second largest 
Italian MPA (the “Penisola del Sinis-Isola di Mal di Ventre”), employing a multi-
disciplinary perspective built on both biological and socio-legal expertise.  
4. The biological study consists in a review a number of existing unpublished data on 
biological resources in the MPA coupled with new analyses of the sea urchin fishery.  The 
socio-legal research consists in the analysis of  primary qualitative research in the form 
of semi-structured interviews conducted with key stakeholders at the local and regional 
level in 2014, followed by two workshops (one with stakeholders and one with the general 
public) in 2015 to discuss the research findings collectively and identify policy 
recommendations . 
5. The results show that the Sinis MPA is not achieving its conservation goals, 
primarily because of actors’ non-compliance with the rules.  The interviews with key 
stakeholders revealed a number of interlinked social, normative and calculative 
motivations at the basis of non-compliance.  Policy solutions are then offered.  
6. This study offers a novel analysis on paper parks that may be applicable to other MPAs 
experiencing similar compliance issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The designation of marine protected areas (MPAs) does not necessarily equate with 
effective management of human activities affecting the biological resources the areas 
host. The literature is full of examples of ‘paper parks’, i.e. designated protected areas 
that are not ensuring a high level of protection on the ground. The causes of 
ineffectiveness vary, ranging from poor  compliance and enforcement levels, to the lack 
of regulations all together, to lack of staff or management authorities (e.g. Jameson et al., 
2002; Mora et al., 2006; Guidetti et al., 2008; Rife et al., 2013; Advani et al., 2015). 
Academics have proposed a range of solutions to address the problem of paper parks. 
This article contributes to the academic discussion by originally drawing on key insights 
of critical regulation literature to develop an analytical framework to both investigate and 
address cases of MPAs where there are compliance gaps with regulations in place. Critical 
regulation theory is an under-explored theoretical field in studies of MPA governance but 
it has great potential to produce an in-depth analysis of compliance issues related to 
environmental management. Indeed, in pluralizing compliance by identifying and 
mapping the range of factors at the basis of actors’ behaviour towards regulation, this 
theoretical framework uncovers the complexity of compliance and its relation to 
regulation, producing a more holistic picture. 
After introducing the theoretical and analytical framework, the paper applies it to 
a case study of an Italian MPA. The MPA chosen for this study is an intensively used 
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MPA for both commercial (fishing fleet comprising 94 boats and 199 fishers; see Casola 
et al., 2014) and recreational (196 personal licences were released for 2015) fishers. The 
MPA is also of high biodiversity importance, as acknowledged by the fact that it has been 
included in the list of Specially Protected Areas of Mediterranean Importance (SPAMI) 
(Decision IG 20/7 of the COP 17 of the Barcelona Convention) and it hosts a Special 
Area of Conservation and Special Protection Area respectively under the Council 
Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora (Habitats Directive) and under Directive 2009/147/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 (Wild Birds Directive).  
Findings from over 10 years of biological research in the area show that the MPA 
is not achieving its biological conservation objectives because of uncontrolled human 
exploitation. Sixteen semi-structured interviews in May 2014, followed by two 
stakeholder workshops in April and May 2015, were carried out to consider the various 
motivations at the basis of stakeholders’ non-compliance with the regulations of the MPA 
and to identify ways to overcome these shortcomings. The paper aims to show the value 
of multi-disciplinary collaborative research in detecting the biological ineffectiveness of 
MPAs and the socio-legal reasons behind such failure. In doing so, it shows the value of 
comprehensive analyses that consider the interrelationship between a key number of 
biological and social variables.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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Paper parks and regulation theory 
MPAs, from the designation process to management and enforcement, require that 
attention is paid not only to environmental issues, but also to the human dimension since 
social, economic, and institutional factors can dramatically affect their effectiveness 
(Charles and Wilson, 2009). Inappropriate planning, poor governance, low enforcement 
level, few socio-economic incentives for compliance, conflicts among stakeholder groups 
and little community involvement in the management are identified in the literature as 
key obstacles limiting conservation effectiveness of MPAs (e.g. Bruner et al., 2004; Ferse 
et al., 2010; Fenberg et al., 2012; Rife et al., 2013; Advani et al., 2015). Therefore, despite 
the overall documented success of MPAs as a tool for marine conservation and fisheries 
resource restoration (e.g. Agardy, 1994; Halpern and Warner, 2002; Branch and 
Odendaal, 2003), studies have demonstrated that management objectives are not always 
met in a substantial number of cases study, effectively rendering MPAs paper parks (e.g. 
Rife et al., 2013; Advani et al., 2015). For Italian MPAs, as for MPAs in many other 
countries in the world (e.g. Walmsley and White, 2003; Byers and Noonburg, 2007; 
Rodríguez-Martínez, 2008; García-Gómez et al., 2010; Edgar et al., 2011), the lack of 
effective surveillance of MPAs is considered one of the greater handicaps, inhibiting 
success. Only those Italian MPAs with strong surveillance and enforcement mechanisms 
showed positive ecological responses, as demonstrated by Guidetti et al. (2008). The 
reasoning is that, in a MPA subject to proper surveillance, actors will comply because 
they fear detection of violations and subsequent sanctions. Enforcement acts as a deterrent 
and pushes actors to comply with the management rules, thus having a positive impact on 
conservation regulations’ outcomes. This view is clearly rooted in classical deterrence 
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theory, where the regulatees (in this case fishers) are self-interest utility maximizers who 
will comply because the fear of detection of wrongdoing, coupled with the amount of the 
penalty outweighs the benefits of non-compliance.  
A more recent study of a Sardinian MPAs has identified other causes leading to 
compliance with MPAs’ rules (Micheli and Niccolini, 2013). The study demonstrates that 
the MPA of "Tavolara - Punta Coda Cavallo" is a “superperfomer” despite very low 
surveillance levels. Good leadership by the director of the MPA and his ability to involve 
various partners in collaborative decision-making decisions are the factors enabling 
success in this case study (Micheli and Niccolini, 2013). However, although academic 
discussions of Italian MPA effectiveness are moving beyond issues of surveillance and 
classical deterrence theory, up to the present moment no multidisciplinary study has been 
carried out to understand and explain the complex range of factors determining 
compliance with MPAs regulations and linking compliance motivations with MPA 
effectivenessin Italy, despite the fact that MPAs are increasingly recognized and analysed 
as complex social–ecological systems worldwide, demanding an multi-disciplinary 
approach (e.g. Espinoza-Tenorio et al., 2010; Pollnac et al., 2010; Bergseth et al., 2015).  
Indeed, there have been many studies worldwide exploring the nature and best 
practice of MPA governance (Christie and White, 2006), focusing on the importance of 
collective action. In fact, considering the nature of the marine environment as a common 
pool resource1 and the related lack of a clear-cut property right regime, MPA governance 
is highly challenging and neo-institutional scholars have drawn on and extended Ostrom’s 
                                                          
1 Common Pool resources are subtractable resources where it is difficult to exclude users as defined in 
the Digital Library of the Commons at: https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/contentguidelines  
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well-known design principles2 for long-enduring commons (Ostrom, 1990) to the sea (e.g. 
Christie et al., 2003; Mascia, 2003 ), and have emphasized the importance of small-scale 
place-based management (Young et al., 2007) and the importance lof ocal stakeholders’  
participation in decision-making (Jentoft et al., 2007).  
However, Jones (2014) argues that there has been a reluctance in some of these 
studies to fully consider the potential that state based regulation can offer, focusing 
primarily on ‘people and civil society’ (Jones, 2014). Jones’ aim is to provide a more 
rounded view of governance re-inserting the role of the state and the law in the picture. 
Drawing on 20 case studies from around the world, he builds a framework based on five 
categories of incentives (economic, interpretative, knowledge, legal and participative) to 
constitute an effective governance system.  Economic incentives include, inter alia, 
green marketing, property rights, diversification, compensation; interpretative incentives 
include education, awareness raising and the role of media, knowledge incentives include 
collective learning, increasing scientific certainty etc, legal incentives include 
enforcement, legal interventions, role of authorities etc. and finally participative 
incentives include participation on decision-making, respect for local traditions, 
promotion of equity etc.  In most of the MPAs reviewed by Jones, legal incentives are the 
key to improve the governance system because they are the supportive factor for the other 
categories of incentives (i.e.  law can support the development of other incentives by for 
                                                          
2 Ostrom’s design principles are as follow: 1.Clearly defined boundaries defining who has rights to 
withdraw resources and the boundaries of the common resource; 2. Congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules and local conditions; 3.  Collective-choice arrangements; 4. Monitoring of conditions 
and behaviour; 5. Graduated sanctions depending on the seriousness of an offense; 6. Conflict-resolution 
mechanisms; 7. Minimal recognition by government authorities of rights of appropriators to organize; 8. 
Nested enterprises with monitoring, enforcement and governance activities organized in multiple levels 
for CPRs that are part of larger system have promoted small-size, placed-based governance. 
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example attaching legal conditions to the development of property rights, operating as an 
economic incentive).     
However, the law and consequently legal incentives are associated with the state 
and top-down mechanisms. Indeed, the call for legal incentives is used by Jones (2014) 
to criticize neo-institutional approaches, which push towards self-governance by local 
actors neglecting completely “the need for top-down approaches and legal incentives” 
(Jones, 2014). According to Jones, bottom-up and top-down approaches need to be 
complementary. If this is in line with classical co-management literature (see Pinkerton 
1989, Berkes and Preston 1991, Pomeroy and Berkes 1997), Jones’ view of law as top-
down, state derived only is one which critical regulation scholarship has long criticised, 
questioning the assumption that the state is the only locus for the development of the law 
and that it retains the final authority. Critical regulation scholars have spoken of 
‘decentred’ regulation (Black, 2001) showing that there are multiple regulatory sites. The 
state is therefore not the only regulator and not always positioned at the top.  
Concentrating on the relationship between the state and other actors and institutions, these 
scholars have demonstrated the complex and fragmented nature of regulation 
(fragmentation of power and knowledge) (Black, 2001; Scott, 2004). These insights have 
clear implications for studies of compliance and enforcement. Indeed, the repositioning 
of the state-based regulation within a complex web of actors and institutions blurs the 
simple hierarchical relationship between regulators as state agencies and regulatees.  
This article attempts to draw on critical regulation scholarship to discuss the 
compliance gap in MPAs, showing that the meaning and operation of MPA regulation is 
extremely complex and varied, it is dependent on actors’ perspectives and actions, and it 
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argues that such complexity needs to be understood and analysed before providing 
effective solutions to MPA governance. 
Non-compliance motivations 
There is a rich and diverse literature on compliance (see for example Hawkins 1989, 
Kuper and Sutinen 1998 and the contributions of Parker and Nielsen 2011 edited 
collection). This literature shows that a key independent variable affecting compliance is 
actors’ motivations.   
As Parker and Nielsen (2011) argue, analyses have increasingly showed the way 
in which non-compliance cannot be simply explained by actors’ attempts to maximize 
their economic or material utility. This is because, as Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) put 
it, actors have “multiple selves” and are not only rational appropriators pursuing self-
interest. Actors are moved by various types of compliance motivations. If cost-benefit 
calculations are likely to play a role in shaping actors’ behaviour, normative and social 
motivations cannot be discounted (Gunningham et al., 2003; Tyler, 2006). Normative 
motivations refer to actors’ perceptions of the legitimacy of a regulatory system, i.e. the 
extent to which actors’ normative frameworks coincide with those of the regulatory 
system in force. Social motivations refer to pressures towards particular behaviours 
exercised by the social groups and culture to which the actors belong (Winter and May, 
2001; Nielsen and Parker, 2012). Moreover, these motivations interplay and are entangled 
in different ways.  
Explaining and mapping actors’ motivations is a fundamental prerequisite for 
providing policy recommendation, and regulation theory can assist us in this task. Work 
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by Baldwin and Black on “really responsive regulation” (Baldwin and Black, 2008), 
argue that to ensure compliance in complex environments, regulators need to be really 
responsive to the regulatees’ compliance behaviour and to their cognitive and operating 
frameworks, to the diversity of regulation tools and strategies, to the broader institutional 
environment, to the performance of the regime, and to changes in all the above, 
developing a dynamic and adaptive approach to regulation.  
Baldwin and Black (2008) is an important contribution in pointing to regulatory 
challenges and wider contextual variables affecting non-compliance but the authors are 
speaking to good-will regulators, not considering cases in which regulators are 
themselves part of the problem by acting in a suboptimal manner. As regulatees may be 
driven by mixed compliance motives (normative, social and calculative) so too regulators 
are human beings, having particular biases. The literature on regulatory capture considers 
exactly these types of situations. Regulatory capture occurs in cases in which “regulation, 
in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest 
and toward the interest of the regulated industry” (Kwak, 2014). However, there is danger 
in the classical regulatory capture literature to consider the regulator only as a rational 
actor, aiming to maximize his/her self-interest, moved therefore solely by short- term 
political gains. More recent accounts of regulatory capture scholarship show that the 
suboptimal performance of regulators may be also attributed to reasons other than 
material self-interest (therefore non-calculative reasons). Regulators, as much as 
regulatees have “multiple selves”. In this context, for instance Hanson and Yosifon (2003) 
have spoken of ‘deep capture’ to consider non-rational influences as causes of captures 
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and Kwak (2014) has coined the term ‘cultural capture’ to discuss situations in which 
regulators’ behaviour is shaped by factors other than material self-interest.   
There are a number of strategies considered by regulation literature to address the 
capture problem and improve the regulatory outcomes, including the consideration of 
counter-arguments, the employment of  independent agencies to represent other 
viewpoints forcing regulators to justify their position and reflect on their cultural biases 
(Kwak, 2014), and the increase of transparency and accountability measures (Lodge, 
2004). In this paper Lodge’s definitions of transparency as making “regulatory activities 
access-and assess-able” and of accountability as “the obligation to account for regulatory 
(or any other type of) activities to another body or person” are adopted (Lodge 2004). 
Dimensions of transparency and accountability are multiple relating to the decision-
making process in setting standards, to the rules followed, to the activities of the 
regulatees, to the controls exercised on regulates, and to the feed-back processes. Three 
different administrative doctrines can be identified pointing to different strategies to 
tackle these dimensions: the “fiduciary trusteeship” doctrine (focused on technocratic 
decision-making), the “consumer sovereignty” doctrine (focused on competition) and the 
“empowering citizens” doctrine (focused on participatory decision-making) (Lodge, 
2004). According to Lodge (2004) ,the “empowering citizens” doctrine seems to avoid 
the risks of the other two by  putting the accent on information, to be publicly scrutinized 
and on the contribution of lay people to regulatory decision-making. However, elite 
capture of the participatory process can occur (Stack 2014).. Stack (2014) showed that, 
based on a wide range of empirical studies on US rulemaking, business interests tend to 
make wider use of participation rights compared to other groups resulting in “a paradox 
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of process” whereby “participatory rights are conceptually fundamental to administrative 
legality but end up substantively shaping regulation in predictable and private-regarding 
ways”.  
To minimize regulatory capture, the “empowering citizens” doctrine suggests 
oversight through local lay-participation. This is likely to reduce the social distance 
between the public, those directly affected by the regulated activities and the regulators. 
However, the success of such an oversight body is dependent on the willingness of the 
public and stakeholders to participate in it, and may ignore instances in which cultural 
inertia is rooted in the wider society and instances in which the participatory process is 
dominated by particular elites. In these cases, independent oversight bodies may be a 
preferred solution.   
To sum up, in order to analyse and address the compliance gaps rendering MPAs 
little more than paper parks from a critical regulation perspective, the various motivations 
at the basis of regulators and regulatees non-compliant behaviour must be first all of all 
detected and then internalised by the regulatory system. In so doing a really responsive 
regulatory system can be produced where regulatory capture is minimized, enhancing the 
legitimacy, transparency and accountability of the system. These theoretical insights are 
explored below in the context of an Italian MPA, the Penisola del Sinis-Isola di Mal di 
Ventre MPA (hereafter Sinis MPA).   
INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY AND METHODS 
Study area: the Sinis MPA 
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Sinis MPA (Figure 1), established in 1997 (Decree 12/12/1997), is the second largest 
MPA in Italy. It covers about 25000 ha and more than 30 km of coast. The MPA is 
subdivided into different zones with different degrees of protection that have undergone 
changes through time mainly due to socio-economic reasons (Figure 2).  
Like many other Italian MPAs, the Sinis MPA is managed by the Local Authority 
(Cabras Local Authority), with the Mayor acting as the MPA President. The local fishing 
fleet, composed of 94 boats and 199 commercial fishermen (Casola et al., 2014) and 
recreational fishers (196 personal licences issued in 2015) is one of the biggest in the 
Italian MPAs. The day to day management of the MPA is carried out by the Director, 
nominated and appointed by the Local Authority’s Mayor for a duration of three years. 
As the appointment is by nomination, if the Mayor is not re-elected the Director also 
cannot continue to hold his/her role, unless they are re-appointed by the new Mayor. At 
present, the Director is supported by one member of staff with a fixed-term contract and 
four part-time assistants, funded by external projects (personal communication with the 
Director, June 2015). Enforcement powers are shared among the Port Authority, the Local 
Police and the Forestry Police (Decree 20/07/2011, n. 188). The management body is 
supported by a Commission (known as “Commissione di Riserva”) that provides expert 
advice regarding planning and management choices, as required by national legislation 
(Act 979/1982, 28 as amended by Act 426/1998, Art 2(16)). The Commission does not 
have statutory powers as its role is primarily consultative. Its members include 
representatives of the Environmental Ministry, of the Port Authority, of the Region, of 
the Local Authority, of environmental bodies and cultural associations.  
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The normative framework of the Sinis MPA is a fragmented but inclusive one, 
consisting of a number of decrees, ordinances and regulations. Next to the decrees related 
to the designation of the MPA, fishing and other sea-users activities within the MPA are 
regulated through a series of ordinances issued by the Port Authority (see: 
http://www.guardiacostiera.it/capitanerieonline/ordinanze.cfm?id=72, last accessed 29 
August 2015) and fishing activities are regulated through a number of decrees issued by 
the Agricultural Department of the Region (Decree 20/07/2011, n. 188 listing all the 
activities that are allowed to be carried out in the different Zones of the MPA). Article 6 
of the Decree 20/07/2011,n. 188 also requires the Environmental Ministry to adopt the 
MPA Regulation proposed by the management body after consulting the MPA 
Commission. This must happen not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the 
Decree 20/07/2011, n. 188. The MPA Regulation has the potential to streamline the 
regulation of the MPA as there no longer will be the need to issue all these separate 
ordinances regulating sea-users activities. However, the MPA Regulation has not been 
adopted yet despite the deadline having expired. 
Methods 
An initial literature review of all available material and the analysis of raw data held by 
the MPA’s offices were undertaken to assess the conservation effectiveness of of Sinis 
MPA. This review, and in particular the consideration  of gray literature and the analysis 
of raw data, has been fundamental to define the conservation level of local biological 
resources and has provided the biological base for the following socio-legal study. In fact, 
if only published literature had been considered (i.e. Guidetti et al., 2008; Coppa et al., 
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2012, 2015) no strong evaluation on this topic including temporal trends could have been 
carried out(only Coppa et al., 2015 included temporal dynamics analysis). Regarding the 
raw data, it was decided to analyse those referring to the commercial sea urchin 
Paracentrotus lividus being one of the most intensely exploited invertebrates in Sardinia 
(Pais et al., 2012 and literature therein) and because of a wide availability of spatial and 
temporal data. A third reason for the choice of P. lividus is the existence of more 
restrictive rules governing its exploitation inside the MPA (e.g. only fishing without 
breathing apparatus is allowed and fishermen have lower personal quotacompared to 
outside; see Decree 28/10/2014, n. 1553 for more details). In fact we found that from 
2003 several sampling campaigns were conducted in the Sinis MPA to define its 
distribution (according both to habitat type and depth), to provide scientific suggestions 
in order to improve fishery regulation and management (e.g. based on stock assessment, 
catch data analysis, gonadal-somatic index variations) and to evaluate the reserve effect 
(i.e. testing if density and mean size are higher inside the MPA than outside) or the 
cascade effect (i.e. study on the relationships among algae, sea urchins and their predatory 
fishes). All the databases coming from the previous studies described above (e.g. 
Facheris, 2004; Baroli et al., 2005; Baroli et al., 2007; Coppa et al., 2010a, 2014; 
Wrachien, 2011) were grouped together and reexamined comparing the values of the sites 
monitored in the same season (summer) and depth range (<5m) in the majority of 
sampling campaigns to analyse the population trend within the MPA and the effectiveness 
of protection measures (comparing different zones of the MPA to outside). Five sites in 
5 years (2004, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2012) with 4 replicates (5 m2) were analysed to describe 
the population trend within the MPA, whereas the assessment of the reserve effect was 
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based on 3 years samples (2005, 2010, 2012) with a total of 6 matching sites (2 per 
protection level with 3 replicates). Multifactorial analyses of variance (ANOVA) were 
applied to check for any significant differences in the total population density or in the 
stock fraction (individuals >5 cm) according to times and/or protection level. Cochran's 
test was used to test for the homogeneity of variances and data were transformed when 
necessary (Underwood, 1997). Post hoc comparisons, by mean of the Student–Newman–
Keuls (SNK) test, were carried out in case of significant differences from ANOVA. These 
analyses will help to improve the picture of the state of biological resource in the Sinis 
MPA which is based on more than 10 years of scientific data collection. 
To investigate the socio-legal causes at the roots of the biological results, 16 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in May 2014 (see Appendix 
A and B for questionnaires). A purposive sampling strategy was employed to select the 
interviewees because the aim was not to use a random sample to generalize at the level 
of the population but to learn from key stakeholders. A maximal variation approach was 
followed whereby researchers sample individuals who differ in key characteristics. 
Interviewees were chosen because they held prominent positions within their sector 
and/or had extensive knowledge of the MPA. As the aim of the study was to investigate 
the governance reasons behind the ineffectiveness of the Sinis MPA, it was decided that 
both regulators and sea-users should be interviewed. The sea-users were primarily 
fishermen, both commercial and recreational, because their activities are the most 
impactful on the MPA. Other external factors, such as currect tourism rates are low and 
therefore of negligible impact (Camedda et al., 2015) and there are projects aimed at 
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increasing levels of eco-tourism (see projects "S&T Med" and "MEET"). The sample 
comprised: 
− 8 sea-users (of which 2 carrying out recreational fishing with tourists (known as 
"fishing tourism"), 2 representatives of recreational fishermen, 2 commercial 
fishermen and 2 representatives of recreational associations).   
− 8 regulators (2 representative of the management body, 2 representatives of 
neighbouring local authorities hosting important access sites to the MPA, 2 
enforcement bodies and 2 representatives of the environmental department of the 
Sardinian Region). 
The interviews’ results were discussed with the interviewees and with the local public in 
two workshops conducted on the 29th of April 2015 and 6th of May 2015. The workshops 
were an important opportunity to discuss ways forward, therefore testing and refining the 
policy directions.  
  




Conservation effectiveness of the Sinis MPA 
Coastal fish fauna, including many commercial species, represents one of the most 
common indicators of MPA effectiveness (e.g. Micheli et al., 2004; McClanahan et al., 
2007; Guidetti et al., 2010; Consoli et al., 2013; Maggs et al., 2013). A study by Guidetti 
et al. (2008) on Italian MPAs demonstrated that the pattern of recovery of target fish was 
strictly related to levels of surveillance and that only 20% of the sampled MPAs had 
adequate levels. This study investigated 15 MPAs between May 2002 and October 2003, 
and Sinis MPA was one of the six “paper parks” (Guidetti et al., 2008). A subsequent 
study by Marra et al. (2016) on fish fauna in Sinis MPA analysed the recovery trends of 
commercial species 7, 10, 13 and 15 years after designation by means of visual census 
technique (see García-Charton et al., 2000 for more details on this technique). The low 
conservation effectiveness of the  MPA was confirmed by the lack of an increasing trend 
of protection across the years inside the MPA as well as a lack of diversification in fish 
size and biomass between protected and unprotected sites and among different protection 
levels (zonation effect) (Marra , 2016). Also the mean fishing yield evaluated by Guidetti 
et al. (2012, 2013), using both landed catch data and fishermen interviews, resulted lower 
in comparison with other Italian case studies and revealed that the management of 
commercial fisheries in Sinis MPA was not sustainable. Finally, the new analysis on the 
temporal trend of the sea urchin Paracentrotus lividus showed that the population within 
Sinis MPA has suffered a significant decrease of P. lividus between 2007 and 2010 
(Figure 3A). The decreasing trend was even more marked when considering the 
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commercial sizes (74% reduction in resource availability in 8 years); the analysis of the 
variance showed two cases of significant stock contraction: the first between 2004 and 
2005 and a second starting from 2010 (Figure 3B). The comparison between areas with 
different fishing regulations through years (two-way ANOVA: only the single factors 
"year" and "protection" were significant, not their interaction) showed no difference 
between inside and outside the Sinis MPA with the exception of the Zones B (no take 
area of P. lividus according to an interim order of the Port Authority (n.58/2014)) where 
density values of P. lividus were significantly higher (Figure 3 C). Despite the negative 
trend shown in Figure 3B, sea urchin stock was always higher within the MPA (also in 
zone C, where fishing is allowed) than outside the MPA (Figure 3D). Therefore, a slight 
reserve effect due to the more restrictive fishing regulations within Sinis MPA was found 
although by itself insufficient to reverse the overall negative trend. 
The ineffectiveness of Sinis MPA can be demonstrated also by considering the 
status of the protandric limpet Patella ferruginea (Coppa et al., 2012, 2015), the most 
endangered invertebrate of the Mediterranean Sea protected under Annex II of Berne 
Convention, Annex II of the 1995 Protocol concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected 
Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean to the Barcelona Convention, and 
Annex IV of Habitat Directive. In the first census, carried out in 2009, a detailed map of 
the distribution of P. ferruginea in the Zone A of Mal di Ventre Island was provided and 
the main constraints for the population spread identified (Coppa et al., 2012). Illegal 
catches were the main cause for the low population density (0.02 ind/m) and the absence 
of large females (>80 mm), even though the study was conducted in the no take-no entry 
Zone of Sinis MPA (Coppa et al., 2012). Further research between 2009 to 2013, 
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investigated the effect of poaching on the distribution of P. ferruginea in Mal di Ventre 
Island evaluating the influence of site accessibility and legal protection (according to 
MPA zonation), thus assessing both the spatial pattern of illegal harvesting and the degree 
of effectiveness of the MPA (Coppa et al., 2015). It was demonstrated that the decrease 
in population density and size occurred initially in the easily accessible sites in Zones C 
and B and then in the no take area of Mal di Ventre Island. Currently, harvesting has also 
moved onto the semi-accessible coast and it is likely that it will spread progressively, first 
in areas that are most easily accessible and then to areas with stricter legal controls. The 
population viability analysis predicted that the population is likely to be extinct within 
ten years if current rates of harvesting are maintained (Coppa et al., 2015). 
There were some positive effects of the MPA on the population trend of Pinna 
nobilis, the largest bivalve of the Mediterranean Sea, protected under Annex IV of the 
Habitats Directive and Annex II of the 1995 Protocol concerning Mediterranean Specially 
Protected Areas and biological diversity in the Mediterranean to the Barcelona 
Convention. This sessile suspension feeder lives mainly on soft sediments colonized by 
seagrass meadows. Sinis MPA and particularly the Gulf of Oristano, is characterized by 
an extensive area of Posidonia oceanica, that appears to be a suitable area for the growth 
of P. nobilis (e.g. Coppa et al., 2010, 2013; Coppa, 2011). Thanks to several awareness-
raising campaigns and to the protection measures in place, the dynamics of the local 
population seem to be driven more by biotic and abiotic features (e.g. food availability, 
bottom current direction and speed, P. oceanica distribution and characteristics) than by 
anthropogenic pressures (e.g. illegal fishing, anchoring, impact of trawling/gillnets/pots) 
(Coppa et al., 2010, 2013; Coppa, 2011). In fact, to protect the P. nobilis population and 
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its habitat, since 2005 the MPA authority installed free buoy fields in all the principal 
sheltered bays within the MPA (Coppa, 2011). Therefore, for many years, these mooring 
structures have largely contributed to minimizing the impact of anchoring on the sea bed 
(Coppa, 2011). A significant increase in population density was observed between 2009 
and 2014 that could be attributed in part to the enlargement of the MPA of 2011 (Camedda 
et al., 2015; Figure 2). Encouraging results can be derived also from the analysis of the 
conservation level of sandy beach ecosystems along the Sinis Peninsula: relevant erosion 
phenomena were never detected and the human impact of  on beach habitats resulted not 
significant (De Falco et al., 2003, 2008; Simeone and De Falco, 2012; Simeone et al., 
2012, 2013). Technical reports on sandy beaches attibute their good conservation status 
to measures put in place by the Sinis MPA (Simeone et al., 2005; Camedda et al., 2015). 
Thus, the general conclusion based on the various biological studies is that Sinis 
MPA has been ineffective for the recovery and management of commercial biological 
resources, nor for the conservation of protected endangered species, especially those 
colonizing easily accessible sites. This raises questions regarding the levels of legal 
compliance and enforcement that exist (Guidetti et al., 2008, 2012, 2013; Coppa, 2011; 
Coppa et al., 2012, 2015; Marra, 2016). These questions were the starting point for the 
socio-legal research, structuring the interviews with key stakeholders. 
 
 
Explaining and mapping non-compliance motivations  
To provide an in-depth analysis of compliance motivations, the interview transcripts were 
analysed with the tripartite distinction of compliance motivations in mind (calculative, 
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social and normative), extrapolated from regulation theory. It is worth noting that the 
separation of compliance motivations into three categories is a useful heuristic device to 
show the complexity of stakeholders’ behaviours and perceptions and a useful tool to 
analyse interviews, though there are causal relations between issues that cross-cut 
motivation categories (Figure 4). Considering that regulators also behave in a suboptimal 
manner, this analytical framework has been used not just to explain and map regulatees’ 
(in this case sea-users) non-compliance motivations but also regulators’ non-compliance 
motivations, thereby adding to existing compliance studies that focus on regulatees 
motivations only. 
Because many of the issues emerging are sensitive, to maintain the anonymity of 
the research participants, direct quotes from specific interviewees are attributed either to 
“sea-user” or to “regulator” using a numbered system to distinguish between them.  
Regulators’ social motivations 
When asked specific questions related to environmental regulations or the ecological 
status of the MPA, not all regulators knew the answer. For example, one representative 
of an enforcement body (Regulator 5) had no knowledge of the process of designation of 
the MPA, no clear perception of the conservation status of the MPA and no administrative 
expertise needed for the role. This was due to two main interrelated factors. On the one 
hand, the   regulator had taken on this role only recently, having held previously a 
different, non-administrative position within that enforcement body in another region of 
Italy, so he could not build on previous expertise. On the other, however, the regulator 
had not attempted to familiarise himself with the regulations and understand local 
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ecological conditions, showing cultural passivity. This is not an isolated case as many 
sea-users lamented regulators’ unwillingness to exercise their powers and duties, 
attributing it to passivity, cultural inertness, indolence and apathy, in a word, “inertia”. 
“It is not lack of capacity but lack of willingness to intervene. I do not know why 
there is such lack of willingness, I do not think it is a matter of corruption but surely 
inertia” (Sea user 1). 
It is fair to say that such inertia however, was not a common characteristic of all 
regulators. Some stressed their willingness to participate in all the meetings related to the 
drafting of the Regulation in order to understand the perspectives of all stakeholders and 
find common grounds for collaboration (Regulator 1 and Regulator 2) and four out of the 
eight regulators interviewed were well versed in environmental law. 
Regulators’ Normative motivations 
If the opinions of the regulators regarding the management rules in place were overall 
positive, their assessment of the application and concrete weight of regulations was far 
more negative. A series of themes emerged, related to both regulatory, procedural, and 
substantive aspects, namely 1) institutional fragmentation, 2) politicization of 
administration, 3) the existence of a black market, and 4) enforcement gaps. All regulators 
criticized the lack of institutional coordination and cooperation existing at various 
decision-making levels: between local enforcement bodies and between the agriculture 
department (having fisheries competences) and the environment department at the 
regional and national level (having conservation competences). The institutional 
fragmentation was primarily attributed by regulators to the politicization of the 
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administrative system in Italy and Sardinia in particular. Such politicization was 
considered to be a driving force behind environmental governance decisions and therefore 
extremely difficult to eradicate. Interviewees criticized the lack of separation between 
technical and political decisions, most evident in assigning all the MPA’s managerial 
powers to one local authority rather than an association of local authorities or to an 
independent scientific body, as is possible under the national legislation (Regulator 1 and 
Regulator 2). However, a counter argument was raised centred on the fact that having a 
local authority as the manager renders the decisions more legitimate, as the local authority 
is the embodiment of a democratic process and therefore more capable of balancing the 
particular interests of different stakeholders with the public interest. Operating alone, 
instead of in association with neighbouring local authorities, was considered optimal to 
speed decision-making by one regulator (Regulator 6), while others argued that an 
association of local authorities would be a better solution considering that points of access 
to the MPA are also located in neighbouring local authorities.  
Regulators also argued that many fishermen continue to fish illegally because of 
a black market. The official fish market is today a large, empty space that had to close 
down because it was not used by fishermen to sell their products as some restaurants and 
private households were buying the fish at a reduced price directly from the fishermen. 
Regulators pointed out that criminal sanctions had never been applied and that 
peoples are aware of the low levels of inspection and enforcement activities. Here it is 
important to recall the findings of the biological studies because in the case of protected 
species not only criminal but also administrative sanctions have never been applied and 
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this has largely contribute to determining the dramatic decline of P. ferruginea (see 
Coppa, 2011; Coppa et al., 2015).  
Regulators justified such low levels speaking of the large size of the MPA, of the 
scarce resources (including human resources) available to exercise day-to-day 
enforcement and also of the fear of retaliation by fishermen if sanctions were applied. 
Regulators’ calculative motivations 
The fear of losing political power and re-election opportunities was considered by three 
regulators as a reason for delaying certain administrative decisions (Regulator 1, 
Regulator 2 and Regulator 5). As key management decisions are made by the politicians, 
it is possible for powerful/large groups to redirect management bodies’ decisions away 
from the public interest and towards private ones. This is clearly an example of regulatory 
capture. 
 “It is also a political question considering that all the administrations do not want 
to impose stringent control to avoid losing the electorate” (Sea-user 1).  
Even the delay for the entry into force of the MPA Regulation was considered by 
some a product of micro-political choices, i.e. a way to avoid losing the votes of the 
fishermen who constitute an important part of the electorate (Regulator 2). 
Also sea users criticized the short-term political gains of regulatory bodies, not 
only at the local level pointing out that many of the decision-making roles are assigned 
to individuals for political reasons rather than competence and expertise at higher levels 
of decision-making. 
Sea users Social motivations 
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“The expression they [local seas-users] use is imbburrai, meaning to gather the 
butter from the milk, that is to say gather all the resources’ richness…without 
thinking about future generations, about the environment because there is the idea 
that the sea is an infinite resource that reproduces itself” (Regulator 2). 
“Here we are in a wild status because we are not real fishermen but improvised 
ones. Cabras’ culture is more lagunar than maritime. There is no tradition of 
generations and generations of sea fishermen. The real fisherman is someone who 
leaves something for tomorrow. Here we do not think about tomorrow” (Sea-user 
3). 
Both regulators and fishermen agreed that the majority of active fishermen, rather 
than understanding the sea as a common good to be managed cooperatively, still consider 
it as an open-access space for resource appropriation; this assumption fully agrees with 
the results of biological studies that showed the stocks decline both of sea urchins and 
commercial fishes. Environmental sustainability considerations and especially concerns 
for future generations seem lacking among the fishermen. Although this understanding 
of the sea is dated as scientific studies have amply demonstrated declines of marine 
ecosystems due to over-exploitation (e.g. Worm et al., 2006; Halpern et al., 2008) and 
international laws, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 
have raised legal questions related to our collective responsibilities over the marine 
environment, the sense of the sea as mare nullius remains strong in the case study area.  
Some of the interviewees attributed this sea-users’ perception to the young maritime 
culture/tradition in the area because the population was, until recently, primarily relying 
on agriculture and those who fished in the past used more intensively the local lagoon in 
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Cabras. Indeed, it was only after WW2 that fishing efforts were directed to the sea 
(Camedda et al., 2010).  
Another cultural trait that was self-criticised by fishermen was the lack of any 
cooperative behaviour and the inability to self-regulate. “The fishermen are a group of 
drifters. If we were all united, imagine what a powerful group we will form!” (Sea-user 
1). This lack of gregarious behaviour means that there is lack of trust between fishermen 
so that “you live in anxiety because you do not know if the next day your fishing nets are 
still there” (Sea-user 3). Also, sea-users mention that they tend not to report illegal activity 
because of the fear of retaliation from other fishermen “Sometimes there is fear of 
retaliation…a burned car. This happened to me this year” (Sea-user 4).  Although there 
is a large number of fishing cooperatives (over 20), fishermen stated that each operates 
on its own because of the unwillingness to cooperate. 
Finally, as sea-users had accused the regulators of inertia, similarly the regulators 
accused the fishermen of lacking interest in participating in meetings regarding the 
management of MPAs. This was attributed by regulators to inertia rather than, for 
example, perceived marginalization due to different ways of expressing and 
communicating different types of knowledge. This inertia negatively impacted on sea-
users’ environmental law knowledge.  
Sea users’ normative motivations 
During the interviews, not all sea-users provided a full assessment of the management 
rules in place but those who did, much like regulators, had a positive perception of the 
regulations including the sanctioning system. Indeed, three sea-users were aware of the 
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types of sanctions in place in relation to their activities and agreed with the existing 
mixture of civil and criminal sanctions. Much like regulators, fishermen criticized more 
heavily the application of the regulations pointing to the lack of environmental 
information and education as well as the lack of exercise of enforcement duties by 
regulators. The perceived lack of environmental information and education was 
discussed:  
“Besides enforcement, environmental education is needed” (Sea-user 7) 
All sea-users interviewed displayed adequate knowledge of the norms that apply 
to their specific sectors but had little awareness of other norms or conservation 
designations overlapping with the MPA. If for regulators, the primary cause for sea-users’ 
lack of environmental knowledge was their inertia to participate in decision-making fora 
and other meetings centred on environmental regulations, for sea-users their 
environmental law ignorance was due to the lack of availability of environmental 
information. So, if regulators pointed to social motivations (cultural inertia), sea-users 
pointed to a normative motivation (difficulty of accessing environmental information and 
exercising this procedural right) to explain their knowledge gap.  
Sea-users’ calculative motivations 
Sea-users and regulators pointed out that the fisheries sector tend to focus on short term 
economic gains. This was exemplified in a number of ways. It was stated that “90% of 
the illegal fishermen are local people who are aware of the existence of the MPA”, so 
illegal behaviour is not necessarily due to lack of knowledge of protection measures but 
to a strategic decision to unsustainably appropriate resources (commercial fisherman). 
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This point can also beconfirmed by the authors' experience: the poachers seen during 
biological monitoring campaigns were mainly local citizens that knew their activities 
were illegal. Secondly, they pointed out that “fishermen cooperatives are all fake, they 
are a way to have easy access to funding” (Sea-user 3) and that when subsidies were given 
to begin fish-tourism activities, many obtained them but, as there were no real checks on 
how the money was spent, very few actually carried out the activities, selling their boats 
after a brief period of time. Today only two fishermen (out of 17 that secured the 
subsidies) keep the fishing-tourism business alive. 
A comparison between the MPA and the lagoon was also made to illustrate the 
importance of short-term economic benefits for sea-users. The fact that the lagoon of 
Cabras is effectively self-monitored while the sea is not is partly due to commercial 
reasons. “We found ourselves in Cagliari with our mullet caught in the lagoon priced at 
5 euros and that illegally caught [in the lagoon] priced at 3 euros. This is why in the 
lagoon there is a stringent self-monitoring system [to avoid losing out to illegal 
fishermen]” (Sea-user 1). 
Finally, the issue of the black market, pointed out above, was considered by 
regulators a cause of sea-users' short-term behaviour, as clearly expressed by Regulator 
1:“Many fishermen keep fishing at unsustainable levels because they are selling their 
products in the black market”.  
The results of the interviews indicate multiple, inter-linked reasons at the roots of non-
compliance. Most of these reasons were acknowledged by both regulators and sea-users. 
These are summarised under boxed themes and their causal links identified in Figure 4. 
The key social motivations are cultural inertia, lack of trust, environmental knowledge 
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gap and lack of a maritime tradition leading to an understanding of the sea as mare nullius. 
The key calculative motivations are political short-termism of the local administration 
and economic short-termism of the sea-users. The key normative causes, de-legitimising 
the governance system in the eyes of both regulators and sea-users, are the perceived 
politicisation of the administration, the lack of institutional coordination, the enforcement 
gap and the existence of a black market. As Figure 4 shows, many of these motivations 
cross-cut categories as they are the product of multiple factors. For example, sea-users 
economic short-termism can be attributed to both the existence of a black market and also 
to lack of environmental knowledge and awareness. Similarly the enforcement gap can 
be attributed to scarce resources and the large size of the MPA but also to the fear of 
retaliation by sea-users if sanctions are applied and to the regulators’ inertia to operate.  
  
DISCUSSION 
Understanding and explaining the ineffectiveness of MPAs is a difficult task 
considering they are complex social-ecological systems, thus requiring a multi-
disciplinary study and a close mapping of the causes at the root of the problem. This 
study has attempted to show the importance of employing a multi-disciplinary 
approach to analyses of MPAs effectiveness, building on biological and socio-legal 
expertise. The biological results have demonstrated that anthropogenic factors 
(primarily over-exploitation of resources) are the basis of the biological 
ineffectiveness of Sinis MPA. The socio-legal study has attempted to understand in 
detail and categorize non-compliance motivations of the actors involved, to outline a 
number of inter-linked causes leading to non-compliance and to provide policy 
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recommendations drawn from regulation theory. In introducing and applying current 
insights of critical regulation theory and compliance studies to MPAs, this study has 
added a new theoretical and analytical framework to the existing literature on MPAs 
governance. But it has also added to the compliance literature in mapping non-
compliance motivations not only of regulatees but also of regulators. Compliance 
studies have primarily focused on businesses, firms or individual regulatees but in 
cases such as the one reported above, also regulators need to be the subject of analysis 
as non-compliance is happening on all fronts of the regulatory spectrum. 
Clearly, as Parker and Nielsen (2011) argue, “there are no likely to be many simple 
‘lessons’ and policy prescriptions from empirical research that seriously seeks to 
explain compliance”. Indeed in relation to the Sinis MPA the policy recommendation 
tha we offer below are not as prescriptive as policy makers may wish them to be but 
at hte same time provide some avenues of reflection for regulatory reform. 
Even if the findings of biological research point to the need to increase 
surveillance and enforcement levels in the short-term to prevent the extinction of 
endangered populations of protected species (i.e. Patella ferruginea) or overexploited 
stocks (i.e. commercial fish and sea urchin), the socio-legal research shows that this 
cannot be the most effective long-term solution in a complex scenario such as Sinis 
MPA. This is because, as pointed out by advocates of the “really responsive 
regulation” approach (Baldwin and Black, 2008), regulation also needs to be 
responsive to cognitive and operative frames of regulatees, so if enforcement translates 
into an increment of punitive strategies, the underlying cultural problems identified 
above will not be addressed. Indeed, more external surveillance and enforcement will 
Environmental non-compliance in MPAs 
32 
 
not raise environmental knowledge, favour the promotion of trust or decrease inertia; 
rather, it is likely to increase levels of mistrust distancing even more the regulators 
from the sea-users. 
Also, enforcement measures are likely to become of secondary importance if co-
operation and trust among citizens, sea-users, scientists and regulators is achieved. All 
those present at the workshops agree with this sentiment. To do so, efforts should be 
directed towards the building of trust, increasing environmental knowledge, sharing 
information and communication/coordination between actors and institutions at different 
governance levels, in a manner akin to Lodge’s “empowering citizens” doctrine (Lodge 
2004). In the case study area initial attempts to begin this work of communication and 
collaboration have been carried out by the authors of this paper both through a number of 
courses directed to regulators and through the dissemination of scientific results to the 
wider pulic. These activities have contributed to improve environmental knowledge and 
in the case of Patella ferruginea brought more awareness of its spatial distribution (Marra 
et al., forthcoming).  The authors of this paper have also conducted a series of educational 
activities with local primary and secondary schools, funded by an ESRC Impact 
Accelerator Award.  
However, educational activities and the building of collaborative platforms are 
unlikely to work instantaneously because of existing regulatory capture issues. The 
creation of independent oversight bodies therefore needs to be contemplated as a first step 
to increase transparency. In the longer term, once environmental stewardship has been 
built through pluriannual educational programmes, oversight through local participation 
can be advanced. Ideally, the independent oversight body should have statutory powers 
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and duties to monitor the performance of stakeholders and of the MPA, holding to account 
any person failing to carry out agreed actions by bringing this to the attention of regulators 
at the appropriate level of decision-making. A step has been taken towards improving the 
accountability and management of all Italian MPAs with the project ISEA (see: 
http://www.progettoisea.it/, last accessed 14 August 2015). The ISEA website includes 
all the conceptual maps on MPA management plans and the filling of a standard 
management form in order to increase the standardization of management measures and 
objectives of the MPAs across Italy. However, the extent to which the ISEA project can 
respond to accountability and transparency issues in full is questionable considering that 
it operates more as a reflexive tool for MPAs than as an oversight mechanism. Also, as 
will be recalled from above, the only institution that operates next to the management 
body is the ‘Commissione di Riserva’ but it is only a consultative body and has a rather 
exclusive membership. A stronger system to audit the quality of environmental reporting 
and implementation should be put in place and strategies to develop independent 
oversight bodies responsible of reviewing the environmental performance of MPAs 
should be discussed. These recommendations were discussed at the workshops and again 
the attendees were in agreement.  However, more than a local agreement is needed in 
order to implement some of these suggestions. It is at the national level that the decision 
to create an independent oversight body can be made.  
To sum up, the Sinis MPA is not an exceptional case of an MPA struggling to 
achieve its conservation goals. It has been indicated that a large number of MPAs in Italy 
(Guidetti et al. 2008) and in the world (e.g. Rife et al., 2013; Advani et al., 2015) are 
paper parks. Reasons for failures need to be analysed carefully and single solutions at the 
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end of the regulatory spectrum (such as increasing enforcement levels) may not always 
be the most appropriate in the long run. Forging long-term solutions for understanding 
and addressing the problem of paper parks requires working at wide structural levels, first 
of all by providing a biological assessment of biodiversity in the area, secondly by 
identifying all the key actors, institutions and factors impacting on the effectiveness of 
specific MPAs. In the case of the Sinis MPA, the key actors are fishermen and regional 
and local regulators because other sea-users have a modest impact on the biological 
resources of the area and regulators outside the region play a marginal role as both fishing 
and conservation activities are devolved to the Regions in Italy. Other MPAs in other 
parts of the world will have a different composition of actors, institutions and factors and 
therefore qualitative studies of this kind need always to be context specific to reflect the 
precise micro and macro variables of the MPA under research. Through its multi-
disciplinary lenses and through the application of critical regulation theory to MPAs 
governance, the above study has provided a detailed picture showing the fragmentation 
and complexity of a particular MPA. However, it is argued that the type of analysis carried 
out may be useful for the study of other MPAs experiencing similar compliance issues.. 
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